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MIŁOSZ’S BIOLOGY LESSON
Abstract: Over the years Visions from San Francisco Bay (1969) has proven to be 
essential both to Miłosz’s life and to his writings. It was there that he formulated, for 
the fi rst time with such a force, the theses that would later reappear regularly in his 
essays and poetry. One vital aspect of the intellectual construction outlined in Visions 
was the concept of Nature. Miłosz proposed a “presentistic” approach, arguing for the 
concept of Nature as an indispensable element of contemporary thought. His refl ections 
were restricted to motifs closely related to his theses about Nature: Nature and beauty, 
human/animal relations, and the theory of evolution.
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1.
“Jestem tu” (Miłosz 1989: 5) –“I am here” (Miłosz 1983: 3). The person-
al pronoun in Polish is only implied, the place yet unspecifi ed. I and the 
world. Perhaps: I in relation to the world. Or rather, as the reader learns 
later, I facing the world. This is the initial formulation of Visions from San 
Francisco Bay. From this unsophisticated – one may say, cognitively un-
promising – antithesis, Miłosz derives the entire anthropology expounded 
in his book.
One crucial element of the intellectual construct presented so expres-
sively in Visions is the notion of Nature, usually capitalised as if to stress 
its role in Miłosz’s argumentation. No matter how we interpret Visions 
today, Nature undoubtedly ranks high among the dominant subjects of 
Miłosz’s investigations. This overrepresentation was immediately noticed 
by Miłosz’s friend Józef Sadzik, who wrote soon after the book’s publica-
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tion: “First of all, light is thrown on Nature. I would say that the book is 
a treatise on Nature” (2004: 1; trans. A.S.).1
Formally, Visions can hardly be called a treatise, since its structure is 
digressive, meandering and kaleidoscopic, but behind these diverse delib-
erations there is one controlling idea. Nature enters the opening chapters 
fortissimo and then returns with a varying intensity, sometimes directly, 
sometimes in disguise. If this interpretation is correct, we may begin with 
reconstructing the main contexts in which the notion is used, with examin-
ing its associations, because the dark semantics of Nature seems the key to 
the philosophical anthropology outlined in the book.
2.
To a stranger from a distant country (“I come from a place without automo-
biles, bathrooms, or telephones;” Miłosz 1983: 36), Nature appears fi rst in 
its diverse inanimate forms. With its peculiar geographical situation, Cali-
fornia provides an excellent vantage point to observe Nature’s marvels. It 
is a borderland in a double sense: the farthest West, bordering on the ocean, 
and an expanse split through the middle by a natural boundary, a fault, “the 
deepest on the continent” (Miłosz 1983: 194).
The fi rst, and overwhelming, impression may be that of an immense 
space painfully irreconcilable with the human size. The Californian experi-
ence is an experience of Nature in excess, in geological ecstasy, in gargan-
tuan hypertrophy of its innumerable forms: “empty hills banked up to the 
horizon” (Miłosz 1983: 7); Crater Lake with its inaccessible steep shores 
devoid of vegetation, a “geological caprice” (Miłosz 1983: 15) defying hu-
man pragmatism; towering redwood forests where “[s]mall human fi gures 
are diminished not by the redwoods’ trunks, too huge for comparisons, but 
by a lower level, in relation to ferns larger than a man and to the fallen, 
moss-covered logs which sprout new green shoots” (Miłosz 1983: 14); or 
Death Valley, the dried-out bed of a salt lake, where silence is “so mighty it 
reverberates with the shifting sands in the dunes, the crunch of the petrifi ed 
salt underfoot” (Miłosz 1983: 15).
1 The review comes from Józef Sadzik’s private archive; it was not published in the 
author’s lifetime.
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Faced with those primal forms of Nature, Miłosz discovers the lack of 
even the most elementary bonds, of the smallest affi nity between them and 
himself. The scale is wrong, a common language is missing, and forebod-
ing silence swallows the human voice like a stone dropped into a well. 
Inanimate Nature appears to the viewer as the domain of radical otherness, 
stony indifference and insurmountable strangeness. Ultimately, it turns out 
to be a senseless emanation of chaos, a habitat of mindlessness, an aseman-
tic abyss of forms and elements where order and meaning can be imposed 
only by the human mind. In this vision, Nature is not a protective and 
trustworthy Mother but an evil Stepmother, insensitive to human yearnings 
and expectations.
Human beings who experience the enormous pressure from the outside 
and the inside (from hostile resistant Nature and from debasing biology 
culminating in death and bodily decay) live their whole life in that outra-
geous trap. Nature is not an impartial player, a loyal ally of the human 
species. Perhaps for that reason Miłosz can justify human conquest of the 
natural world: “I am prepared to accept (…) the sight of man destroying 
nature” (1983: 148).2 These are shocking words when uttered by a former 
naturalist, but they conform to the entirety of his mental construct. The 
conquest of Nature – a part, as Miłosz indicates, of human destiny (a re-
fl ection of the Biblical command “replenish the earth, and subdue it;” Gen 
1: 28) – has the opposite effect as well: the victim takes vengeance on its 
violator. On the one hand, “subduing” Nature has led to the construction 
of its civilized double, a second Nature “which to its members appears to 
be Nature itself, endowed with nearly all the features of that other nature” 
(Miłosz 1983: 68), equally alien and hostile.3 On the other hand, Nature’s 
revenge consists in the hypertrophy of corporality and in the growing ex-
pansion of the sexual myth. Paradoxically, the more we strive to rid our-
selves of the natural heritage, the deeper it affects us, as if to confi rm the 
2 But in the following sentences, as if to temper those harsh words, Miłosz laments 
over the wasteful logging of the Californian redwoods: “A lover of the forest, I turn my eyes 
away from the hideous destruction on the mountain slopes where the saws have passed. The 
ecological balance destroyed, this forest will never grow back. Or was that part of the cost, 
too?” (1983: 148).
3 “The very body of a person, whether he be educated or not, recoils from a cold, bril-
liant, perfectly consistent slab of metal, glass, concrete, or synthetic materials which cannot 
be embraced by sight or touch, and it recoils from the power residing behind that armor, as 
well” (Miłosz 1983: 67).
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psychoanalytical discovery that the denied element returns with redoubled 
strength.
The bonds between humans and animals, the animate emanation of 
Nature, are an illusion: “[t]he enigmatic quality of our relationship to the 
bear – fond affection mixed with fear, the ancient tribal ritual of apolo-
gizing after killing one, children’s furry teddy bears. Our playful liking 
for raccoons” (Miłosz 1983: 16). Some closeness between species must 
not be confused with likeness or, horribile dictu, with essential identity. 
Theirs is not our world. The human mind contemplating the animal exist-
ence perceives no sense in its biologically determined duration, no shred of 
the semiotic. Animalness itself is not accessible to us (cf. the unanswered 
question “What is jayness?;”4 Miłosz 1983: 20), and all we know about it 
turns out to be a projection of human categories on nonhuman creatures. 
We have nothing to do with them, or they with us. There is an ontological 
gulf between us – strangeness, otherness, indifference. In our attempts to 
understand animals, Miłosz suggests, we run into an insurmountable bar-
rier dividing the species. Such a conclusion put forward by an erstwhile 
naturalist carries some weight.
Despite more or less perceptible ties with other animals, despite the 
biological organism that makes humans, to some extent, “the kin of the 
butterfl y and the crab” (Miłosz 1983: 175), man is a freak of Nature. This 
is not a mere hackneyed expression. Miłosz speaks no less unequivocally 
here than when giving his opinion on inanimate Nature: human animal-
ness, though real, belongs to the domain of accidents; substantially, we 
remain outside animal categories. Humans are a separate species, by their 
very nature condemned to loneliness among other living beings.
Despite all the kinships with the animal world, human nature is radi-
cally different because it is twofold. It is this internal fi ssure, this irredeem-
able split that sets us apart. As Miłosz explains: “Consciousness, intelli-
gence, light, grace, the love of the good – such subtle distinctions are not 
my concern; for me it is enough that we have some faculty that makes us 
alien, intruders in the world, solitary creatures unable to communicate with 
crabs, birds, animals” (1983: 175–176). And, paradoxically, this uniquely 
human quality, variously named, contributes to the cosmic alienation of 
human beings, their total isolation in the world of Nature.
4 It may be a repetition of the famous “What is magpiety?” from Miłosz’s poem “Mag-
piety” (1999: 129).
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This is how Miłosz perceives human beings: as alien to trees, rocks 
and the ocean, exotic to the crab, the butterfl y, the jay… His aphoristic as-
sessment of the human condition leaves no room for doubt: “enmity was 
established between us and nature” (Miłosz 1983: 176).
Surrounded by the natural world, human beings differ considerably 
from characters in Caspar David Friedrich’s paintings, for they are not 
solitary wanderers keeping elegant silence in the face of pantheistic Na-
ture. The picture Miłosz paints is much more dramatic. Here, Nature seems 
essentially dumb, absurd (i.e. “senseless” or “deaf,” as in Latin absurdus), 
nonhuman or even anti-human. All these expressions converge in the im-
age of the ocean, which is probably the most emblematic fi gure Miłosz uses 
to describe the natural world. When discussing Robinson Jeffers’ superior 
attitude to the human civilisation and his admiration for awe-inspiring Na-
ture, Miłosz writes polemically:
I also would have been unable to oppose eternal beauty to human chaos. The 
ocean, to him the fullest incarnation of harmony, was, I admit, horrifying for 
me. I even reproached Jeffers for his descriptive passages, too much those of 
the amateur painter who sets up his easel on a wild promontory. For me, the 
ocean was primarily an abyss where the nightmares located in the depths of hell 
by the medieval imagination came ceaselessly true, with endless variations. 
My kinship with the billions of monsters devouring each other was threatening 
because it reminded me who I was and their unconsciousness did not absolve 
me from sin (1983: 90).
Indeed, the other name for Nature in Miłosz’s writings is the Abyss, 
conceived not only as a bottomless space; religious connotations, glim-
mering in the quoted text, are indispensable for its deeper understanding.
This abysmal quality of Nature has yet another dimension: expansion 
of the naturalistic outlook into areas which, so far, have been reserved for 
religion. The contemporary vanguard of the naturalistic view are biology 
lessons, with the theory of evolution as a mandatory interpretation of the 
natural and human world. Miłosz regards the theory, and especially Dar-
win himself,5 with undisguised abomination, perceiving the proposition as 
an effi cient tool in un-deifying the world. Reasons for his repulsion are 
meaningful.
5 His ambiguous assessment of Darwin (early fascination and then fi xation) deserves 
a separate study.
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At one point, Miłosz’s meditations on the essence of Nature take on 
a distinctly religious tone. Adopting Simone Weil’s remarks on matter, 
Miłosz reads the natural order as the domain of necessity, force of gravi-
tation and ruthless determinism. Nature is an arena of permanent fi ght, 
ceaseless murder, a seething universe of cruelty.6 Big fi sh eat small fi sh, 
something always becomes food for something else. When human values 
are left aside, Nature seems to remain outside good and evil. But when we 
invoke our categories, the natural world – impersonal, indifferent, murder-
ous, subject to blind causality – shows its demonic aspect, “indifferent de-
terminism assumes diabolical features” (Miłosz 1983: 175). This demonic 
aspect of Nature manifests itself also in us: “[Nature] reaches our most 
intimate places” (Miłosz 1983: 29). Human beings, having a twofold na-
ture, belong partly to the domain of necessity, and this always drags them 
down, into the abyss.
The western man, therefore, experiences an unremitting confl ict on 
a nearly cosmic scale, a religiously conceived struggle between Darkness 
and Light:
What, then, is the light? The divine in man turning against the natural in him – 
in other words, intelligence dissenting from “meaninglessness,” searching for 
meaning, grafted onto darkness like a noble shoot onto a wild tree, growing 
greater and stronger only in and through man (Miłosz 1983: 175).
Now it becomes clear that Miłosz’s remarks on Nature belong ulti-
mately to the religious discourse, the broadest framework within which 
he views the natural world. In this peculiar theology, partly Christian and 
partly Gnostic, Nature is no longer an axiologically neutral concept, but 
rather a negative value. Anti-human and anti-sensical, it not only signifi es 
disintegration and death, but also expresses the demonic order.
To sum up, the anthropology presented in Visions falls into the broad 
category of religious philosophy. Regarded sub specie naturae, man is 
a paradoxical being, partly belonging to Nature but essentially exceed-
ing the natural order, and the two inner spheres remain in confl ict. This is 
a schismatic anthropology, anthropology of a permanent divide, of two im-
mutable fi ssures. The fi ssure between man and the natural world cannot be 
6 “The sundew fl ower closes over the insect it has seized, an adder glides among the 
fl owers, a hawk tears another hawk to pieces – the necessary, the irreversible – and who 
would ever have dreamed of communicating with nature other than through conquest, com-
petition, the strong the winners, and the weak the losers?” (Miłosz 1983: 28).
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mended; all fantasies about “return to nature” are ridiculous because they 
substitute an idyllic myth of Nature for its real image. Similarly, the fi ssure 
separating the divine and human from the human and natural aspects of 
man is an irremovable stigma. Therefore, it seems almost symbolic that 
Miłosz proposes his “split” anthropology in the immediate vicinity of the 
Californian fault, where the word fault means both a fracture in the earth’s 
crust and a fl aw, an error or culpability, which may point to some pre-
established dark fatalism of Nature.
3.
Visions from San Francisco Bay anticipates themes which recur in Miłosz’s 
later essays and poems, specifi cally dark Nature and human problems with 
it. But can the book still attract the reader’s attention after all those years?7 
Has time worked to its advantage or disadvantage? Most importantly, is 
Miłosz’s vision of Nature interesting for historical reasons only or can it be 
a valid intellectual proposition even now?
How should we read Visions today? Generally, three methods of analy-
sis have been employed so far: the fi rst draws on Miłosz’s biography and 
stresses the role of experience in his evolving views on Nature; the second 
relies on the bibliographic principle and demonstrates the “naturalistic” 
motifs recurrent in his later works; the third, ideological, reveals links be-
tween Miłosz’s vision and various historical systems of thought, the Gnos-
tic system in particular. The explanatory value of these methods seems to 
have been somewhat exhausted. It is time to look for other interpretations 
that would help us see the text anew. When rereading Visions, however, we 
must overcome a certain diffi culty. Miłosz’s book is not a scholarly study; 
as a volume of essays it defi es traditional academic examination. But treat-
ing Visions as a collection of subjective confessions or irresponsible fanta-
sies would be dishonest – it would do Miłosz more harm than good.
7 If Józef Sadzik’s testimony is to be credited, the publication of Visions in the late 1960s 
drew a meagre critical response. Sadzik expresses his disappointment and suggests, euphe-
mistically, that readers are not ready for that level or scale of argumentation: “I have been 
waiting for a profound debate, a response from a wide circle of subtle and diverse minds (…) 
but it seems that Miłosz stays in regions which many of us have not sensed yet or, even less, 
experienced” (2004: 1).
Przekładaniec_2.indd   65 8/29/2013   11:05:53 AM
66 DARIUSZ CZAJA
I would like to suggest another method of reading Visions: viewing its 
philosophical and religious concept of Nature within contemporary para-
digms of thought. Contrasting backgrounds tend to highlight characteristic 
features of analysed samples. Moreover, such a juxtaposition may bring 
out tacit assumptions which support Miłosz’s entire intellectual construct 
but are less visible in an “internal” reading. I will restrict my study to three 
themes linked closely to Miłosz’s opinions on Nature: Nature and beauty, 
the relationship between the human and the animal, and the theory of evo-
lution.
Nature and beauty 
Visions contains descriptions of the natural world: eucalyptus trees on 
slopes, “hills tending to rose and violet for a few months a year” (Miłosz 
1983: 7), sea lions frolicking on a basaltic rock… But the descriptions 
seem to be drawn casually, half-heartedly. The author reproaches himself 
at once, conscious of their aesthetic function: “picture postcards in prose 
are not my specialty” (Miłosz 1983: 8). He tries to see Nature outside 
the conventions which govern its perception, ignoring the symbolic and 
metaphoric fi gures used customarily by the western mind to describe and 
understand the natural world. Aware of the cultural straitjacket restricting 
human responses, Miłosz wants to face Nature without the paraphernalia 
of clichés, conventional associations and metaphors which merely obscure 
the truth. He strives heroically at getting closer to Nature in order to catch 
it “naked,” unarrayed in stereotypes. Of course, his attempts are doomed to 
failure, which he knows very well, but at least they clear the ground of the 
sentimental, consoling or aesthetic notions. His strategy of disillusionment 
is intended to reveal true Nature as if an Sich – Nature indifferent, hostile, 
fi lled with suffering and dread. Hence the rift.
Readers of Miłosz’s poetry may regard the grim image of Nature pre-
sented so emphatically in Visions as somewhat peculiar. Excuse me, they 
are tempted to say, but what about the epiphanous “instant of low white 
clouds before the rising of the moon” (Miłosz 1999: 353)? What about 
“a hibiscus, alamanda, a red lily” (Miłosz 1999: 379), so delightful in their 
shape and colour? What about the seducing “red maples, brown oaks, 
birches/ with a light yellow leaf here and there” (“Sezon” [Season]; trans. 
A.S.)? About the “fl ying high the heavy wood grouse” (Miłosz 1999: 65)?
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Aren’t these an ecstatic praise of the created world, a laudation for its sen-
suous side? Indeed, excerpts from Miłosz’s poems might be combined 
into a powerful hymn glorifying multiform Nature, whose animate and in-
animate manifestations are so often perceived as mysterious hieroglyphs, 
a code of the unseen.
How can one reconcile Miłosz’s vision of callous demonic Nature with 
his vision of Nature captivating with its beauty? How should one interpret 
that ambivalence? Is Miłosz’s praise of Nature performed contre coeur? 
This was Werner Herzog’s attitude. The director expressed his unequivocal 
aversion to Nature, his disgust at it. In one of his interviews, he spoke with 
truly Gnostic rage:
And nature here is vile and base. I wouldn’t see anything erotical here. I would 
see fornication and asphyxiation and choking and fi ghting for survival and 
growing and just rotting away. Of course there is a lot of misery, but it is the 
same misery that is all around us. The trees here are in misery and the birds are 
in misery. I don’t think they sing, they screech in pain. (…) Taking a close look 
at what’s around us, there is some sort of harmony. There is the harmony of 
overwhelming and collective murder. (…) There is no harmony in the universe. 
We have to get acquainted to this idea that there is no real harmony as we have 
conceived it. But when I say this, I say this all full of admiration for the jungle. 
It is not that I hate it. I love it, I love it very much. But I love it against my better 
judgment (Cronin 2002: 163–164).
In their approach to Nature, both Miłosz and Herzog take up Scho-
penhauer’s refrain natura devorans, natura devorata; they both side with 
anti-Nature and are similar even in their grim vision of oceanic life.8 Her-
zog expresses his stance with the paradoxical formula of love in hatred, 
or vice versa. He declares his loathing for the natural world, though his 
productions (several of his feature fi lms, and his documentaries even more 
so) counterpoint this unequivocal opinion with visions which can be best 
described as sublime. In the most impressive scenes of his narration, Na-
ture appears as an impenetrable all-powerful element, with its majesty un-
derscored by liturgical music (cf. the fi nale of Encounters at the End of the 
World).
8 In his famous “The Minnesota Declaration,” Herzog wrote: “Life in the oceans must 
be sheer hell. A vast, merciless hell of permanent and immediate danger. So much of a hell 
that during evolution some species – including man – crawled, fl ed onto some small conti-
nents of solid land, where the Lessons of Darkness continue” (Cronin 2002: 302).
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With Miłosz, it is somewhat different. Enamoured of Nature in his youth 
(and this love had an overtly erotic overtone9), he soon recovered from 
his passion: “I loved you, Nature, until I understood who you are” (“Do 
Natury” [To Nature]; trans. A.S.). And who/what is Nature? In the brutally 
veristic portrait presented in Vision, love is replaced by the awareness of 
a monstrous and pointless chain of births and deaths, of incomprehensi-
ble inherent cruelty. The image of the natural world which we know from 
the poems, the tender phenomenology of colours and forms written out in 
verses, focuses on Nature’s outer shape, where it most often emanates its 
mysterious beauty. This is a mere camoufl age. For Miłosz, Nature’s beauty 
disguises its intrinsic evil. Such a clear separation of beauty and truth in-
dicates either that the wonderful shape conceals infi nite layers of mindless 
cruelty10 or that Nature’s beauty is distilled into intricate patterns in poetry 
while “the whole truth” about it remains in the real world, the truth that 
does not set us free. Consequently, beauty inheres not in Nature but in 
the language recording its shape (“Everything was the rhythm/ Of shifting 
trees, of a bird in fl ight;” Miłosz 1999: 309). Let us stop at this ambiguity.
Animals
As expressed in Visions, Miłosz’s views on animals, especially on their 
relations with human beings, have two thought-provoking features. Firstly, 
the reader may get the impression that the human and the animal worlds 
have virtually no contact with each other, as if they existed in absolute 
separation, though side by side. A sundew waylays an insect, sea lions idle 
on a basaltic rock, a hawk crosses the sky; the bear and the raccoon appear 
anecdotally, and the jay simply is, not knowing anything about its incom-
prehensible jayness. Animals murder and hurt one another searching for 
food, while people watch them through binoculars from afar – watch them 
with surprise, indignation, less frequently with delight.
9 Visions includes a chapter on the femininity of Nature, “Woman as a Representative of 
Nature” (Miłosz 1983: 26–29).
10 This may explain Miłosz’s hysterical response to educational TV programmes about 
nature. Miłosz considers them as obscene since their makers show, often in a beautiful form, 
photogenically and impassively, a spectacle of the stronger hunting for and devouring the 
weaker: “The story that they convey through their images is a moving illustration of the 
theory of evolution, of natural selection, and so on” (Miłosz 1994: 49).
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Secondly, the text focuses on certain categories of animals: mammals 
living in the wild, birds, insects. The idea of a faint similarity between 
human beings and crabs or butterfl ies recurs several times; there is also 
a mention of a beetle fl oating in a swimming pool (Miłosz 1983: 78–79), 
akin to Gombrowicz’s beetles on the Argentine beach, and of a wasp cut in 
two with a knife, possibly exempt from suffering:
In the presence of nature, I am not “I;” I bear the stamp of my civilization, and 
as it does, I have a sense of dread and repugnance for the impersonal cruelty 
built into the structure of the universe. However, I do suspect that in humaniz-
ing pain – i.e., applying man’s pain to everything alive – an error is committed: 
different from the earlier belief that animals were just living machines, but not 
a much better error nevertheless. Perhaps those creatures without conscious-
ness bear no suffering in our sense of the word, and besides, there is very lit-
tle chance that we will ever succeed in reproducing the sensations of nervous 
systems less developed than ours: a wasp cut in two with a knife, or, rather, the 
part of it separated from the thorax, will continue to sip honey; a beetle who has 
just lost a leg will continue scurrying down a path with undiminished energy 
(Miłosz 1983: 24).
This conjecture, however, is left without elaboration. We are complete-
ly distinct from crabs, butterfl ies, unsuffering wasps and beetles, and the 
similarity between us is limited to the organic sphere.
The image of animals presented in Visions is not accidental. Its two 
features have a great signifi cance and persuasive force. On the one hand, 
they demonstrate the inherent cruelty of the animal world, and on the other, 
confi rm the belief that humans and animals are absolutely separate.
Crabs, butterfl ies, wasps. Why not cats, dogs or horses?11 Or pigs? 
Would their presence sully the lucid message of the text? What about ani-
mal farms? Zoos? About the Kentucky Fried Chicken? This is America, 
after all. Why is there no mention of millions of animals slaughtered every 
year to feed masses of people? The answer is simple. If those topics were 
introduced, the circle of animal cruelty would have to include humans, 
which would weaken the logic of the entire construct.
We may not be able to comprehend the being of a wasp, just as we are 
still unable to answer Nagel’s classic question: “What is it like to be a bat?” 
(cf. Nagel 1974). But what about a cow, a dog or a horse? To say nothing 
11 Miłosz once mentions a cow (1983: 113), but only as an example of ruminating mind-
lessness.
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about chimpanzees, genetically so close to us, in order not to take Dar-
win’s name in vain. What we know about emotional behaviours of those 
animals may be a human projection to some degree12 – but, it seems, not 
a dramatically erroneous projection. Observations made over the years do 
not lie. Anthropomorphism applied to certain animal species is not a mind-
less theorising but shows an important characteristic of the human mind.13 
So-called “animal Nature” comprises a broad spectrum of traits, a whole 
world of diverse creatures occupying various positions along the scale of 
similarity to humans (particularly in regard to awareness, also awareness 
of one’s own suffering).14
Miłosz, however, sees an impassable chasm between the species. His 
stance may be explained quite simply. Despite everything, Miłosz wants to 
save the special position of humans among earthly creatures; he declares 
openly, although not without irony, that “he is on the side of man, for lack 
of anything better” (1983: 172). Human beings owe their special posi-
tion to their intellect – this is undisputable. More controversially, Miłosz 
treats this human element inside the organic machinery as sacredly perfect, 
for unclear reasons. And when he writes: “the responsibility for our mis-
fortunes is not borne by intellect but by intellect unenlightened” (Miłosz 
1983: 177), his argument sounds like a sophistic evasion. Enlightened or 
unenlightened, intellect is intellect. As a matter of fact, this concept of hu-
man uniqueness, intended to counterbalance the tendencies to simplify na-
ture and naturalize man, is based on misunderstanding. The fact that man 
is also an animal does not signify that man is nothing more. The fact that 
human beings result from many evolutionary changes and are descended 
from an ancestor common to all primates does not signify that they merely 
replicate the common source. The fact that intellect has its biological his-
12 On problems with anthropomorphism, its kinds, advantages and disadvantages, see 
Daston 2005: 37–58.
13 “When humans imagine animals, we necessarily reimagine ourselves, so these epi-
sodes reveal a great deal about notions of the human – the ‘anthropos’ of anthropomorphism” 
(Daston, Mitman 2005: 6); cf. also Serpell 1996.
14 I will quote one instructive example: “Nearly ten years ago, my friend Claudius, 
together with a team of zoologists and psychologists, carried out experiments on rhesus 
monkeys at Stony Brook University. The experiments were very painful to the monkeys, as 
electrodes were inserted into their small brains. One night Claudius checked on his animals, 
which were placed in cages standing in a row along a long corridor. The monkeys squatting 
in their cages held out their tightly clenched hands to one another through the bars. At the 
university psychopathologic unit, the line of the monkeys’ hands stretched ceaselessly from 
one end of the corridor to the other. From evening to daybreak” (Kott 2002: 15; trans. A.S.).
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tory does not signify that it can only be analysed in biological terms. And 
so on. Actually, the opposite is true: by revealing the animal origins of the 
human species, evolutionism has emphasised our essential distinctness (the 
question remains how to describe this distinctness more clearly) without, 
however, denying its biological genesis. Besides, why should our sense of 
community with the rest of the animate world be a disgrace? If Darwin 
bears any responsibility here, it is not for the imaginary dethronement of 
humans but for liberating them from priding themselves in their species, 
the pride derived from their imperial exegesis of the Biblical phrase “fi ll the 
earth and subdue it.” This is the triumph of human intellect. After all, the 
theory of evolution has been formulated by the man Darwin, not by an ape, 
even if an unusually intelligent one.
It is quite symptomatic that in this theological construction there is 
no trace of empathy with animals. Intentionally or not, Miłosz assumes 
the traditionally Christian point of view – with all its consequences. Man, 
equipped with intellect, is an exceptional being, the crown of creation; ani-
mals, having no awareness, cannot suffer; man has no moral obligations 
towards them, and their killing is morally neutral. Miłosz appears not to 
notice, or to be unwilling to notice, anything peculiar in these conclusions. 
He describes, often with emphasis, the horror of murderous Nature, seem-
ingly without realising that certain human practices which involve animals 
maintain and intensify this demoniac quality of the natural world. One of 
such practices is the killing of animals as an amusement, which cannot be 
considered as patterned on animal cruelty. The Anglican theologian An-
drew Linzey, exposing a belief quite common among hunting enthusiasts, 
comments soberly that hunters do not “imitate” natural cruelties but create 
them (cf. Linzey 1995: 124).15
As regards the essential difference between humans and animals, Miłosz 
seems to be constant in his opinions. In his late poem “Żółw” (Turtle; a sub-
tle allusion to the Galapagos Islands and Darwin’s tortoises, perhaps), he 
writes once again about the animal’s being as inaccessible to man: “com-
munity of the living but community incomplete” (Miłosz 2011: 1321; trans. 
A.S.). The hard shell protects the turtle against predators, but it may also 
stand here metaphorically for cognitive inaccessibility. There is no sim-
ple transition from the human to the animal. The poet Tadeusz Różewicz 
would not entirely agree with that view. In his poem “Świniobicie” (Pig 
15 See also Czaja 2009: 110–125.
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Slaughter), he depicts the pig as a witness to our common fate: “poor pigs/ 
how these innocent creatures/ suffer, sensing their imminent death” (1991: 
93; trans. A.S.). From Różewicz’s perspective, pigs have emotions, they 
feel and suffer. Thus the chasm between animals and humans need not be 
unsurpassable; however unpleasant it sounds, the pig may, in some sense 
and to some extent, become part of the human world.
In A Year of the Hunter, Miłosz notes on September 13, 1987:
After a day at the annual pig roast that Allan organizes in his family’s summer 
house near Big Sur. Between steep hills that are almost totally parched by the 
sun to a golden bronze, there is a gully formed by a stream; luxuriant grass, 
trees (mainly alders and sequoias), shade, bindweed, masses of lady’s-smock 
near the water, almost the same magical greenery that suddenly appeared amid 
the dryness in the ravine near the ancient cloister in Nonza, on Corsica. A whole 
pig, stretched out on the coals, roasted from six in the morning to four in the 
afternoon (1994: 41).
A still life with a dead pig. A concise report devoid of emotions.
It’s a beautiful day. The stream fl ows in the quiet, leaves shine with 
gold, the pig rotates on the spit. Such is the order of the world. Nature’s 
perfect indifference, the indifference shared by the one who watches and 
describes. A moment’s refl ection reveals that, in this case, it was not a his-
torical necessity nor a blind instinct but culinary tastes and gourmandism 
that had brought the pig to the Californian fi re. Intellect, will: the human 
in man – very human. Is insensibility, then, really restricted to Nature? Are 
“the lament of a slaughtered hare,” “a beetle half-eaten by a bird, a wound-
ed lizard” (Miłosz 2003: 285) the only forms of cruelty in the universe? 
And if animals are blameless because they are unaware (“We are the only 
ones who say: cruelty;” Miłosz 1999: 221), should the blame not be laid on 
those equipped with awareness? I leave these questions open.
Evolution
The image of the world conveyed and consolidated in society by biology 
plays a crucial role in the entire mental construct of Visions. One chapter is 
entitled “On the Effects of the Natural Sciences.” Evolution is by no means 
a neutral term in Miłosz’s vocabulary; rather, it is used with a grimace, 
as a rude epithet, an insult. Miłosz, already emotionally involved when 
discussing Nature, becomes impassioned when dealing with the theory of 
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evolution and its destructive impact on contemporary thinking, on reli-
gious imagination in particular. “The desire for the miraculous is exposed 
to severe trials by the so-called natural order of things,” he writes in “The 
Lesson of Biology,” a chapter of The Witness of Poetry, published fourteen 
years after Visions (Miłosz 1983: 50–51). He considers it as a matter of 
the utmost importance because, he maintains, contemporary imagination is 
still ruled imperceptibly by Darwin (together with Marx and Freud). This 
idea recurs in Miłosz’s work several times (cf. Miłosz 2010a: 36–37).
His opposition to the premises and cultural consequences of evolution-
ism is uncompromising. The theory of evolution is a true bête noir in his 
pessimistic depiction of the Western world. Like his other views concern-
ing Nature, Miłosz’s opinion on the theory has not changed fundamentally 
since Visions; rather, his aversion to it seems to have deepened, especially 
as regards its destructive infl uence on the religious outlook. In one of his 
late essays, Miłosz writes: “I don’t quite understand how the Vatican was 
able to acknowledge the theory of evolution when the biological sciences 
are the crowning achievement of the Enlightenment and create the most 
horrible diffi culties, erasing the dividing line between man and other liv-
ing beings” (2010a: 41; trans. A.S.). The Enlightenment, of course, is yet 
another incriminated entry in Miłosz’s list.
What piques Miłosz in the evolution is not its existence itself (though 
we may get the impression that he would gladly erase the discovery of the 
evolutionary mechanisms from the history of science), but the fact that the 
Darwinian view of the development of species includes man, which has 
negative implications for anthropology. The acceptance of the evolutionary 
model of life results in the acceptance of the image of the world that moves 
inanely “from nowhere to nowhere” and of human life as an aimless play 
of coincidences. Miłosz fi nds the doctrines repulsive because, more or less 
obliquely, they promote the revolting vision of the human (and nonhuman) 
world as a monstrous spectacle of everybody fi ghting everybody else for 
survival. In this context, the expression “rat race” loses its metaphorical 
sense and becomes a description of reality. What is more important from 
Miłosz’s perspective, the promotion of the evolutionary concept leads di-
rectly to barren imagination, since it depicts the world as deprived of its 
charm, meaning and metaphysical basis – a world devoid of the divine 
breath of life.
Of course, there is nothing reprehensible in this kind of opinion, and 
one can hardly argue over someone else’s assessments. The problem is 
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that Visions and Miłosz’s later essays present a view of the process and 
theory of evolution, especially of their dire consequences for anthropology, 
which, though impressive, is simplifi ed, biased and at times misleading.16 
What does Miłosz really criticise? We may suspect that the poet does not 
distinguish between the evolution as a natural fact, confi rmed by ample 
evidence, and more or less radical evolutionist theories, even though there 
is a considerable difference between evolutionary biology and, say, social 
Darwinism or social biology. He sometimes moderates his position, stat-
ing that his criticism concerns mainly the debased version of evolutionism 
for the masses, but he clearly rejects all this biologistic narration en bloc. 
Interestingly, distrustful as Miłosz is of the “scientifi c view of the world,” 
particularly of biological achievements, he speaks warmly of new physics 
as a science which enriches imagination and opens one to transcendence.17
Let us focus on one issue, probably the most important to Miłosz: that 
of biology versus religion. Miłosz often suggests that the anthropologies 
entailed by these two spheres cannot be reconciled. On the Origin of Spe-
cies excludes the Book of Genesis: “We reacted with anger and offended 
dignity when it was learned that man, too, belongs to the chain of universal 
transformation – that ‘he is descended from the monkeys.’ A justifi ed reac-
tion to painful knowledge” (Miłosz 1983: 22–23).
Indeed, the evolutionist doctrine (not science!)18 has infl uenced the 
popular consciousness for a long time, supposedly undermining, if not in-
validating, the religious outlook. But can we state today, a hundred and 
fi fty years after Darwin’s theses, that biological sciences are in permanent 
confl ict with religion? Can we say with confi dence that the world of na-
ture is governed tyrannically by mechanisms of natural selection bereft of 
16 For a thorough survey of evolutionists’ and creationists’ arguments, see Pietrzak 
2010: 203–230; for a discussion of problems with accepting the theory of evolution, espe-
cially in the Christian context, see Życiński 2011: 37–49; for a presentation of the role of 
negative stereotypes in perceiving the theory of evolution, see Gould 2001. 
17 “After all, we still live in Darwin’s world. And I would say that there is a discrepancy 
between biological sciences and physics. The world of quantum physics differs from that of 
Darwin” (Miłosz 2010b: 155; trans. A.S.).
18 Miłosz seems not to distinguish between a science, which examines facts and rela-
tions between them, and a scientifi c doctrine, which goes beyond those fi ndings. W.J.H. Ku-
nicki-Goldfi nger, a brilliant microbiologist, writes: “Biology is not interested in the meaning 
of the world nor in the purposes of human life; it is not even interested in the meaning of 
life as a natural phenomenon. It only examines the mechanisms of life and its development” 
(1993: 71; trans. A.S.).
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miraculousness and that biology does not open the mind to the spiritual 
dimension of experience?
Below, I give two examples of a fascinating meeting of the biological 
with the spiritual, one taken from literature, the other from science.
Though I cannot comment on the crab, as one of Miłosz’s creatures, 
I can discuss the butterfl y. Vladimir Nabokov famously caught butterfl ies. 
He was a professional entomologist – he discovered several species, one 
was even named after him. Years of practice gave him a profound knowl-
edge of the Lepidoptera.19 The following remarks from Speak, Memory: An 
Autobiography Revisited might bewilder staunch adherents of biological 
determinism:
When a certain moth resembles a certain wasp in shape and color, it also walks 
and moves its antennae in a waspish, unmothlike manner. When a butterfl y has 
to look like a leaf, not only are all the details of a leaf beautifully rendered but 
markings mimicking grub-bored holes are generously thrown in. “Natural se-
lection,” in the Darwinian sense, could not explain the miraculous coincidence 
of imitative aspect and imitative behavior, nor could one appeal to the theory 
of “the struggle for life” when a protective device was carried to a point of 
mimetic subtlety, exuberance, and luxury far in excess of a predator’s power of 
appreciation. I discovered in nature the nonutilitarian delights that I sought in 
art. Both were a form of magic, both were a game of intricate enchantment and 
deception (Nabokov 1989: 125).
Nabokov’s observations by no means deny the spectacle of cruelty in 
the natural world. They show, however, that fundamental laws of nature 
may sometimes fail, that the natural world includes enclaves of miracu-
lousness reaching far beyond useful pragmatics, and that biology, too, can 
produce entities strongly reminiscent of works of art. His words restore 
confi dence in the possibility of returning to Nature’s mysterium fascinans 
– not to its aesthetic dimension but precisely the biological one. This pos-
sibility, Miłosz claims in Visions, has been lost for ever (1983: 21–22).
The second example concerns the precarious junction of science and 
faith, of biology and theology. The most diffi cult issue to Christian believ-
ers seems to be the randomness of evolution. But is it true that this acci-
dental character of the evolutionary process can in no way be reconciled 
with the purposeful act of creation described in the fi rst verses of the Book 
19 The entomologist Robert Michael Pyle says that Nabokov’s interest in butterfl ies was 
often viewed as a harmless obsession, in spite of his expertise in lepidopterology (cf. Boyd, 
Pyle 2000: 35).
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of Genesis? Does the acceptance of the evolutionary perspective inevitably 
shatter the Biblical, and Christian, belief that human beings have been cre-
ated “in the image of God” (Gen 1: 27)? Must evolution and God be mutu-
ally exclusive? Not necessarily.
If Genesis is not treated as an excerpt from a handbook of biology, 
astronomy or anthropology but read according to the standards of Biblical 
hermeneutics, and if the Creator is not perceived in a naively anthropomor-
phic way, a certain solution emerges. The hypothesis of theistic evolution, 
called BioLogos, put forward by the eminent biologist Francis S. Collins,20 
proves that the evolutionist view need not lead to dogmatic atheism (as 
it does in the apparently irremediable case of Richard Dawkins). While 
commenting on God’s possible participation in “such an apparently ran-
dom, potentially heartless, and ineffi cient” (Collins 2007: 204) sequence 
of events as the process of evolution, Collins writes:
But how could God take such chances? If evolution is random, how could He 
really be in charge, and how could He be certain of an outcome that included 
intelligent beings at all?
The solution is actually readily at hand, once one ceases to apply human limi-
tations to God. If God is outside of nature, then He is outside of space and time. 
In that context, God could in the moment of creation of the universe also know 
every detail of the future. That could include the formation of the stars, planets, 
and galaxies, all of the chemistry, physics, geology, and biology that led to the 
formation of life on earth, and the evolution of humans, right to the moment of 
your reading this book – and beyond. In that context, evolution could appear 
to us to be driven by chance, but from God’s perspective the outcome would 
be entirely specifi ed. Thus, God could be completely and intimately involved 
in the creation of all species, while from our perspective, limited as it is by 
the tyranny of linear time, this would appear a random and undirected process 
(Collins 2007: 205).
I quote this passage not for apologetic reasons but to show that the 
evolutionist view may not be at odds with some form of spirituality. Thus 
20 Collins is one of the most brilliant contemporary geneticists, former head of the Hu-
man Genome Project, evolutionary biologist and believing Christian. He proposes a way of 
thinking in which faith and knowledge remain separate, and biology is an ally of theology, 
not its enemy. He derives his hypothesis from a remarkable imaginative power, which may 
be a strong counterargument to Miłosz’s mantra about evolutionism destroying the sources 
of imagination. In contrast with the concept of Intelligent Design, BioLogos is not a scien-
tifi c theory but a theistic outlook, though open to debate with science. Consequently, it does 
not use God to patch up current knowledge, as the Intelligent Design does.
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understood, evolutionism, which acknowledges facts and is open to reli-
gious intuitions, questions the validity of Miłosz’s suggestion that once the 
perspective of faith is accepted, the confl ict between the religious and the 
scientifi c visions of the world must be deepened.21 Rather, I would agree 
with the geneticist Jerry A. Coyne:
Accepting evolution needn’t turn you into a despairing nihilist, or rob your life 
of purpose and meaning. (…) Nor must it promote atheism, for enlightened 
religion has always found a way to accommodate the advances of science. In 
fact, understanding evolution should surely deepen and enrich our appreciation 
of the living world and our place in it (2010: xix).
There are many evolutionisms today, no longer based on the mechanis-
mic order popular in Darwin’s times; science, aware of its own limits, has 
abandoned positivist dogmatism. Miłosz’s diatribes against the theory of 
evolution seem to belong mentally to the 19th century.
Briefl y speaking, the butterfl y need not be a mere tool of blind evolu-
tion, and the evolutionary vision of the origin of species need not exclude 
the transcendent dimension. Perhaps the whole complicated relation be-
tween biology and theology should be thought over anew. For the start, we 
should perhaps return to Bergson and search for the real meaning of the 
term l’evolution creatrice.22 Is a metaphysical interpretation of evolution 
possible? I leave this question unanswered.
21 “Whoever treats religion seriously, should strive to intensify its confl ict with the im-
age of the world imposed by the victorious science and technology, instead of patching up 
the fl aws and maintaining – for external, or even internal, use – that they are not dangerous” 
(Miłosz 2010a: 30; trans. A.S.).
22 Historians of philosophy write: “Bergson describes the history of evolution conceived 
of as the work of the vital thrust in things. This history is that of a continuous effort of in-
vention which, unique at its origin, scatters itself through the vegetable kingdom and the 
animal kingdom, where it branches off, on the one hand in the direction that leads to insects, 
especially to hymenopters, while, on the other hands, it follows the line of the vertebrates 
and culminates in man. The solution represented by the hymenopters is that of instinct. The 
solution represented by the vertebrates is that of intelligence, but, in both cases, the solution 
has been found by the same initial thrust, or impulse, which is the fundamental energy at 
work in the history of the world” (Gilson, Lagan, Maurer 1966: 313).
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4
“I am here. Those three words contain all that can be said – you begin those 
words and you return to them. Here means on this earth, on this continent 
and no other, in this city and no other, and in this epoch I call mine, this 
century, this year” (Miłosz 1983: 3).
This is the beginning of Visions from San Francisco Bay. Viewed over 
forty years after the book was written. I am here. Not Miłosz and not in 
California. But the problems Miłosz once posed to his readers still prove to 
be riveting. My solutions may be peculiar to me, but I, too, face the funda-
mental questions concerning the status of nature and the resulting shape of 
anthropology. Admittedly, there are no cognitively compelling unequivo-
cal answers in sight, and those given with absolute certainty today may 
turn out to be outdated tomorrow. Nevertheless, the Californian biology 
lesson continues.
The texts we read are never cognitively neutral but always anchored in 
biographies, outlooks, philosophies. We decide whether we treat Miłosz’s 
visions as outmoded misperceptions or as penetrating insights that are still 
relevant. We may be reading Miłosz’s book, but the book is also reading us.
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